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A B S T R A C T
This paper discusses the key political, anthropological and socio-cultural functions of political myths in the appear-
ance and functioning of totalitarian regimes. A special emphasis is put on structural elements of the myth (mythemes)
and the mythic content (narratives) in the processes of artificial construction of a new society (community) based on the
myth-inspired ideological postulates. The paper argues that the establishment of totalitarianism marked a certain an-
thropological devolution. This devolution, in turn, proceeds through the deconstruction of civil society as an organic so-
cial sphere and the artificial construction of a new political community based on ideological postulates and political
myths. In support of this assertion, it is first shown how the mythical narratives – transformed into political concepts
and programs–were the basis of (re)interpretation of the world, society and individual, and essentially determined the
nature and functioning of the totalitarian regimes. Then, the specific political myths are analyzed and compared, as well
as their content and origin, and particularly their dual function. It in turn is analyzed in the framework of the classical
society–community dichotomy, where the (civil) society is founded socio-politically on the social contract, and the (politi-
cal) community socio-anthropologically on political myth. In a situation of identity and legitimacy crisis, anomie and the
weakening of social cohesion – the characteristic conditions of the great economic and political crisis of the early twenti-
eth century that enabled the emergence of totalitarianism – society as a contracting community does not work. A strong
need for meaning (at the individual and societal level) affects the citizens’ susceptibility to (political) concepts of (re)con-
stitution of (political) community with which they can identify. Right there, totalitarian movements use the cohesive
power of the political myth that replaces the rationally based constitution of society, and becomes a means of ideological
mystification and political manipulation. Affecting the mind of the citizens, it moves their feelings and motivations and
directs their behavior toward the goals of the totalitarian political power. Recent iterations of totalitarianism (Great-Ser-
bian aggression), with the same tragic consequences, were a warning on the actuality of political myths and the danger of
a resurgence of totalitarian tendencies.
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Introduction
Myth, in its classical interpretation, means ancient
belief about the origins of the world, natural causes, of
gods and heroes, which stems from the inability of com-
prehension (due to lack of knowledge) and from human
need to explain the world. In the mind of the ancient
man, the forces of nature appear in the transcendental
forms of gods and fantastic beings which rule the world.
The mythic attitude towards reality was, therefore, a
religious one. Due to its syncretic character and uni-
versality, myth is the dominant form of human spiritual-
ity from ancient to modern cultures; a promoter of cer-
tain moral values, community, and symbols and rituals in
which they’re expressed. On the one hand, myth medi-
ates the dimension of the Sacred, declares one hardly
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comprehensive truth, but also exposes the dimension of
the Profane, gives to the people »the truth« that they can
understand. Finally, myth dresses both these truths,
both realities, religious and mundane, heavenly and hu-
man, into the suit of poetic expression1.
Since the beginning of anthropological research, myth,
along with magic and religion, is among the most persis-
tently explored topics. It is more likely a sign of its com-
plex nature, than an indicator of success of the discipline
in explaining it. Inherent in such a long-standing and at-
tentive regard is the deep discomfort that anthropology
still experiences about the problem of how best to treat
what is, for us, other people’s strange and »exotic« state-
ments about reality. The question that has yet to be an-
swered is, which (and whose) reality is it that myth
speaks to2? Classic anthropological approaches consider
the myth as an essential element of oral tradition and
folk culture, i.e. the product of the collective conscious-
ness which emerges through the long period of develop-
ment of a certain culture. However, in the case of politi-
cal myths, they are not a product of the collective, but the
result of (political) activity of individuals or small social
groups in a certain political situation, when so created
myth is accepted by wide social groups. Political myths
thus impose themselves as valid interpretations of state,
society, hierarchy, political authorities, leadership, social
relations and social roles, and past, present, and the fu-
ture of the society; they provide explanations and mean-
ing to the political society; they integrate and legitimize.
In the context of modern mass societies the power of po-
litical myths is particularly manifested, especially their
dominantly instrumental and manipulative function,
which best became apparent in the emergence of totali-
tarian ideologies, and establishment and existence of to-
talitarian regimes which marked the twentieth century.
Since the power relations, forms of social control and
ways of their achieving, as well as tradition, religion,
myths and symbols which determine them and through
which they are expressed – are core subjects of study of
political anthropology – relationship between political
myths and totalitarianism belongs to the very center of
its interest. Therefore, this article deals with the interde-
pendence of myths and politics. Given the complexity of
this relationship, it limits itself to examining only certain
aspects of it, particularly causal relationship between po-
litical myths and totalitarianism, i.e. key functions of po-
litical myths in the emergence, shaping, and functioning
of totalitarian regimes.
The crisis of democracy in the early twentieth century
manifested primarily as a crisis of legitimacy, a crisis of
political representation, and an economic crisis. These
conditions of crisis have marked specific social and politi-
cal context in which totalitarian ideologies and totalitar-
ian regimes based upon them appear, as an eminently
modern phenomenon, different than all previous autoc-
racies. On the other hand, political myths also had an in-
fluence on the content and conceptions of totalitarian
ideologies and regimes. Specific mythemes and mythic
narratives translated into ideological and political con-
cepts provided the foundation for a (re)interpretation of
the world, the society, and the individual, significantly
determining the character and functioning of totalitar-
ian regimes. Their Manichaean nature, in turn, was in
the base of organized violence upon the others and the
different, including their termination.
The article, therefore, tries to analyze etymology,
structure, and content of characteristic political myths
from a political-anthropological aspect, and shows how
they affected the ideology and political conceptions of to-
talitarian regimes. Special attention is paid to structural
elements of political myths, which have their reflections,
but also iterations with identical consequences, even de-
cades after the downfall of those regimes. For example,
after the historical defeat of fascism and Nazism and the
downfall of communism, near the end of the last century,
very similar political myths shaped the great-Serbian po-
litical project which, after an unsuccessful aggression
against neighboring nations, failed in a similar way, with
long-term and tragic consequences.
In that context, it is argued that the establishment of
totalitarian regimes based upon specific political myths
has marked a certain social and anthropological devolu-
tion. It manifests itself through deconstruction of the or-
ganic social sphere (primarily, civil society) and through
artificial construction of a new society and a new culture
based upon the mythically inspired ideological postulates.
On one hand, this thesis seeks confirmation through
sociopolitical analysis of specific causes of the emergence
of totalitarianism and its consequential effects on the
civil sphere. The analysis takes place within the soci-
ety-community dichotomy of classic modernization the-
ory3, where society is established socio-politically upon
the social contract, and (political) community upon socio-
-cultural determinants (tradition, origin, ethnic and cul-
tural identity) which necessarily include political myth(s).
In a crisis of identity and legitimacy, and value anomie
and weakening of social cohesion, the society as a con-
tractual community does not function. A strong need for
meaning (on both individual and social level) influences
the citizens’ susceptibility to (political) concepts of (re)-
constitution of (political) community, with which they
can identify. It is precisely here that totalitarian regimes
use the power of political myth, which acts as a cohesive
factor, and completely substitutes the rationally based
constitution of society.
On the other hand, through the anthropological anal-
ysis, the article tries to demonstrate a key influence of
political myth(s) on the establishment, functioning, and
apology of totalitarian ideology and totalitarian regimes.
Special emphasis is put on structural elements of the
myth (mythemes) and mythic content (narratives) in the
processes of artificial construction of a new society (actu-
ally, a community) based upon mythically inspired ideo-
logical postulates. Namely, the influence of mythemes as
essential and irreducible elements of a myth structure4,
independent of various mythic narratives and mythic
symbols, is shown to be crucial in the totalitarian project
of political, social, and ideological (re)constitution of soci-
ety. In the certain sociopolitical situation (social crisis),
in different societies and periods (the beginning and the
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end of the twentieth century) the archetypal mythic
structures are restored through newly-created political
myths and political ideologies upon which totalitarian re-
gimes are based. That relationship of mutual causality,
not always being transparent, needs to be further clari-
fied. The analytical framework of political anthropology
appears to be the most adequate and functional theoreti-
cal framework for this analysis.
About Myth and the Mythic Structure
As an essential component of oral tradition and folk
culture, classic anthropology comprehends myth as an
ancient belief about the origins of the world, natural phe-
nomena, gods and heroes. It stems from the man’s need
to explain the world in conditions of inability of cogni-
tion. Therefore, the forces of nature, in the mind of the
ancient man, appear in transcendental forms of deities
and fantastic beings which rule the world. Therefore,
mythical and religious become intertwined.
Etymologically put, Greek mitoV (mythos) means word,
speech, and narration (about gods and their attitude to-
wards people). But mitoV also means »an appearance
formed entirely inadvertently and unconsciously«, as op-
posed to ligoV, which means »consciously analyzing and
bonding conceptual thinking«5. Myths, therefore, rely
primarily on the irrational and the power of emotions.
Myth (mitoV) is opposed to the rational (ligoV – logos).
With the development of the antique (Greek) philosophi-
cal thought – just by the confronting –logos gets the
meaning of the reason, what is connected with rational,
deliberation, and right cognition, while mythos increas-
ingly gain not just the meaning of a story, but the mean-
ing of a false, made up story, something that contradicts
reason and true cognition. The meaning of the word
»myth« narrows in such a way, but on the other side it ex-
tends into a kind of fundamental opposition between the
two approaches to cognition. Thus the myth and the
mythic are marked by the emotional, magical, and mysti-
cal, while logos is marked by the rational, the analytical,
and the theoretically intuitive6.
Myth is an attempt by mankind to comprehend the
reason and the purpose of the existence. Through the
language of metaphor and symbols, it creates vivid worlds
and beings that, although not always related directly to
the ordinary world around us, provide answers to our
fundamental questions about the true nature of the
world around us. Whether or not we believe in the myth,
the power of language and the images created by it have
determined collective perceptions through the millennia,
substantially influenced social formations, and inspired
art, music, and poetry7. Campbell (1991) distinguishes four
main functions of myth: mystical, cosmological, sociolog-
ical/political and pedagogical. The mystical provides for
the realization of wonder and mystery. The cosmological
reveals the nature of the mystery. The sociological/politi-
cal supports and validates the social structure/political
order. The pedagogical guides individuals through life
crises from childhood, through adulthood, and death.
Myth can also be understood as a completely formed
and integral system of belief. As such, it is a standalone
and independent complex needing no other foundation
except claim, no logic except itself. Since it is founded on
the irrational, on a fantasy, it inverts the empiric reali-
ties and contradicts the rules of logical reasoning, and
can thus be an obstacle for cognition and credible facts.
However, myth is an exceptional driving force, having a
series of encouraging elements which drive individuals
and large social groups in revolutionary movements. A
well-composed myth can incite political action, and also
serve as a means for »socialization of souls«, by which the
individual becomes part of the political community8.
Myth also functions as a language, not in the sense of
spoken language but specific language, i.e. a form of ex-
pression that functions in many languages and cultures.
Thus the key structural components of a myth (myth-
emes), expressed in mutually opposed concepts/ values,
are recognizable in many cultures, independently of the-
matic and linguistic differences, through the dichotomy
of symbols and meanings (e.g. life and death, heaven and
earth, male and female, hunting and agriculture, etc.).
Therefore many myths are, despite originating in differ-
ent cultures and having different content, essentially
very much alike. Consequently, myth is a product of
those opposed values and meanings. It acts symbolically
and creates a framework for explaining and resolving so-
cial conflicts. Most mythemes, among other things, pos-
sess the characteristic of universality, and for precisely
that reason they repeatedly emerge in various social and
temporal contexts9.
Mythology precedes history; it is inevitable, natural
and inherently necessary to language (understood as the
public discourse). This strong link between myth and
language, especially later in the context of modern soci-
ety, shows dangerous tendencies of turning the language
into a tool for producing illusory fiction which legitimizes
the most unsavory constellations of power10.
Mytheme and narrative are both integral parts of the
myth. Mytheme also represents the underlying event
and/or occurrence which rests on an attractive, but most-
ly historically and scientifically unconfirmed particulari-
ties (ie. someone’s supernatural power, strength, wit,
beauty...). It is often based on fictionalized events from
nation’s history or a significant individual (Prince Mar-
ko, Musa Kesed`ija, Veli Jo`e, superiority of an Aryan
race, etc.). In addition, the underlying construct of myth-
eme can be found in an unusual natural phenomena, im-
ages or occurrences that are characteristic of a certain lo-
cality (ie. frequent lightning strikes in the mountain
which can become a base for myth, etc.). Sometimes a
character or physical (sub)characteristics of a nation can
also be the basis for the emergence of mythemes (ie. high
and lazy Montenegrins, low and hard-working Pygmies,
etc.).
Unlike mytheme, which represents the core of a myth,
its second part – the narrative – represents the entire
construct which gives a pragmatic, sometimes political
context to a myth. In other words, mytheme therefore
represents a fundamental fascination with myth settings
(ie. lightning strike, large caves, one’s height, strength,
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beauty...), while the narrative, as a constituent part of
the myth, takes over its pragmatic communication with
recipients.
It is interesting that, in the interrelationship of myth-
emes and narratives, the mytheme is mainly narratolo-
gically »static«, that is the basic setting of a mytheme
(fascination) will harder and less frequently change, while
the narrative is »responsible« for cognitive algorithm or
designing, shaping and catalyzing the mythemes into an
adequate message, taking into account the subjectivity of
the time which the myth is »transmitting«.
Consequently, mytheme, as a component of a political
myth, gives a topical socio-political definition, while the
narrative frames it into a socially acceptable narrative
matrix (ie. ideological constructs, motivational talks with
a message, theater, movies, etc.).
Myths are therefore extremely popular in the political
context because, as demonstrated in the previous lines,
they can very effectively be added to a political rhetoric
and political narrative eros, moreover – they are often in
their basis. History is replete with political pamphlets
which have often rested on the insistence of a disctivness
of a nation or a race, as well as on any kind of superiority,
as a kind of »cyclotron« of political pragmatism, that is –
political ideology.
If we try to look at mythic narratives in this particu-
lar context, we regularly encounter two vital aspects of
their subsistence: folk tradition and art. In the folk tradi-
tion, mytheme becomes enriched through the narrative
and placed into a utilitarian function of glorifying the
power of the people or an individual. In the art, a
mytheme gets additional narrative dimension through
the Aristotelian unity of action, time and space.
A classic example of myth adaptation is the play
»Kanjo{ Macedonovi}«, created by the motives of a short
story by Stefan Mitrov Ljubi{a. Kanjo{ Macedonovi} is
superman from Budva, who is in a constant struggle
against evil – the Venetians (a comparison with Veli Jo`e
is apparent). This mythical narrative, placed in an artis-
tic sub-context, becomes a convenient instrument which
very skillfully uses the phenomenology of myth (the leg-
end of Kanjo{ Macedonovi}), artistic narration (the play)
and the context of time in which is performed. Thus, it
can be said that this is, in some extent, a modernized
mythical epic story with elements of a musical, tragicom-
edy and melodrama.
In other words, the cultural shaping of myth and
mythic structure gives its persuasive element an added
value, because the idea of archaic myth serves as the axis
of the plot and mythic narrative, as a complete construct,
becomes artistically designed and staged. In this way, by
artistic design or staging, the message of the myth and
its persuasive effect on the recipients is enhanced fur-
ther.
Myth and Ideology
Although myth is akin to the ideology, because both
mediate values and beliefs, ideology is a more coherent
and rather comprehensive belief system, mostly about
social relations. Most succinctly, it is a coherent set of
ideas and beliefs accepted and promoted by certain social
groups that explains and justifies the preferred political
order and of social/political actions for its attainment.
Without entering into a separate analysis of the term, it
is possible to specify several aspects common to all ideol-
ogies. They are: cognitive (which determines the under-
standing of the world), affective (which distinguishes
good from bad, i.e. provides right evaluations in a moral
sense), political (which determines political goals, pro-
grams and political actions) and social (ideas of social or-
ganization and its purpose, social solidarity).
The difference between myth and ideology lies in the
way each arises, and the way each functions in history.
Myth is the characteristic form of belief of the antique or
primitive man, while ideology is the characteristic form
of belief of the modern man11. Myths are about the origin
of beliefs while ideology, which aims to serve class inter-
ests, is about the molding of beliefs. Mythological con-
cepts need to be interpreted symbolically and that »myth
is itself a primordial form of human symbolical activity
and, like language, it is pre-logical in nature«12. Mythical
symbols are archetypes which have an irrational quality
and constitute »the fundamental forces making for per-
sonal integration and, of course, social organization»13.
Myth supports ideology, and key elements of this support
are rituals and symbols. Namely, ideology as a program-
matic or rational side of any political movement is not
enough to gather a significant group of followers or to en-
courage political action on the sufficient part of the mem-
bers of some community14. Myths prove the validity of
certain political ideas by showing that they can and have
to be realized. Mythmaking is therefore indispensable to
ideology. It is common to all political communities (such
as the nation and the state) that besides rational they
also need a mythical foundation. It is because »myth op-
erates not only as a construct in which to view one’s envi-
ronment, but as a driving and motivating force for ac-
tion. It unifies and creates a national (or state) entity
greater than the sum of its political parts. It must serve
not only as a result of action, but as a catalyst«15. Hence,
politics is being dominated by rituals, symbols and
myths. They all foster group identity, far more emotional
than rational, and they become more pronounced the
weaker the understanding of social and political pro-
cesses is. Best examples of that are the fragile democra-
cies established after World War I, constituted rationally
and formally – which by itself wasn’t enough to ensure
sufficient consensus, and was unable to provide wide-
spread sense of national unity. That is the main reason
(additionally fostered by economic crisis) why they failed
and were replaced by totalitarian regimes, who well un-
derstood and heavily used the power of myth.
Political Myths
The Enlightenment thought of the 18th century car-
ried out a demythologization of the former culture, de-
claring myths superstitious, and a legacy of the old
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world. However, in the new world, which is tried to estab-
lish on rational basis, a space for new myths opened up.
They, however, had no connection whatsoever with the
classical myths; their objects are not transcendental,
ideal beings, but specific aspects of social reality. Thus,
political myths are actually pseudo-myths. Transcenden-
tal meanings are given to certain (political) ideas, people,
social groups, and particular aspects of social relations.
Such myths become the basis for political ideologies and
political communities founded upon them, so precisely
there is a birthplace of the political myth. It therefore
tells not only of establishment of a certain political com-
munity, but clearly indicates of its structural features.
On the other hand, political mythmaking is a way of
making political events intelligible in the light of political
beliefs as well as justify and strengthen certain political
ideologies and/or regimes. Production and reproduction
of mythic narratives are constant features of political
life. Some of them acquire importance over a long span of
time, while others have just an ephemeral currency.
Although autocracies and democracies use political
myths evenly, they do it for much different purposes.
Namely, in democracy, political myth is not a weapon
used to destroy the social structure. Since there exists a
wide awareness and consent regarding the rules of politi-
cal action, myths are integrated into the discussion of is-
sues, not into the system. The situation becomes tragi-
cally different when a group of political actors starts
using myths as a means for destruction of the democratic
system. In that context, political myths have the function
of perverting and destroying reality, rather than merely
increasing the political impact of substantive issues. The
supporters of an antidemocratic party willingly accept
the group myths as reality, even empirically verifiable re-
ality. They therefore become obedient and effective fol-
lowers, but never a politically mature electorate. In the
case of large masses of such followers, they undermine
and finally destroy the system of parliamentary democ-
racy16.
It is common for all political myths to create general-
izations which extremely simplify or distort objective re-
ality, with the purpose of increasing the emotionally
based mass support for a certain political party or a party
leader. They are believed without asking for arguments,
they explain complex political phenomena in a very sim-
ple way, and they spread because they satisfy deep social,
but also individual socio-psychological needs. Old truths
are constantly reinterpreted as political realities change,
and new cultural traditions are invented by myth-mak-
ers who repair the web and drape emergent groups with
the mantle of authority. Because a myth makes hidden
connections between disparate ideas based on unspeci-
fied premises, public discourse in mythical form is rela-
tively immune from rational criticism that points out its
logical contradictions or evidence which disconfirms it.
When such a pattern of discourse effectively dominates a
polity, it is a powerful force constraining political change.
Yet, political myths also play crucial roles in times of cri-
sis and can be used – especially in rituals through which
myths are enacted – to achieve even revolutionary
change17. Their frequent motif is the return to the roots,
the origins from the traditional mythic narratives. How-
ever, they are connected to existing social relations or po-
litical regime which is considered problematic, and exit is
sought precisely in the resurrection of mythic elements
and idealized community of the past, i.e. in return to the
absolute beginnings or the lost paradise described in the
myths. The old world must die in order to give birth to a
new, clean one, from the restored elements of the mythic
past18. In political myths, the original stimulative and co-
hesive function of the myth is usually transformed in the
manipulative one. The idealized, basically archaic image
of the world, is gradually turned into a new profane reli-
gion and becomes the designated collectivist framework,
limiting the freedom of the individual.
In the context of modern societies, mythic conscious-
ness and mythic content always grow stronger in diffi-
cult (crisis) social situations. Social crises are regularly
marked by economic deprivation (unemployment, exis-
tential threats) of large social groups, which results in so-
cial insecurity, social anomie, and feelings of fear, weak-
ness, disorientation, and hopelessness. It is exactly these
socio-cultural and socio-psychological consequences that
make up a breeding ground for (political) manipulation,
i.e. uncritical acceptance of messianic and savior ideas
promoted by coryphaeus of totalitarian political projects.
Manipulation of fear is one of essential instruments of
regressive politics, which is why imposition of political
myths is always accompanied by abuse of human emo-
tions. Fear caused by the consequences of social crisis is
artificially amplified by an »image of the history of false
concreteness and conspiracy theory«, whose greatest
danger lies in the »grain of truth contained in that false
image of history, which has to be there in order to look
convincing«19. Namely, conspiracy theory is based on the
idea of the existence of an enemywhich threatens the funda-
mental values of the system. The enemy figure (its religious
counterpart is the devil, manifestation of the evil) is an inte-
gral part of political mythology. Hence stem the negative
mythic patterns, i.e. anti-symbols which are used tomark all
the others (and different) as enemies, a threat to the class,
race, nation, state. They are stigmatized as the greatest cul-
prits for all of society’s problems (scapegoating) which there-
fore need to be destroyed (e.g. Jews, Roma, Slavs, bourgeoi-
sie, capitalists, etc.) in order to realize the political project of
a clean, new, and perfect society. Thus, a certain institu-
tionalization of fear is introduced, and the necessity of perse-
cution of the regime’s enemies is justified20.
In conditions of fear and alienation, the man will,
»feeling powerless towards the giant social apparatus,
the political apparatus and absolutism (...) bring God
down on earth, deify the statesmen, and devise and sup-
plement his loneliness, social and work partialization
and division, exclusion from society, and inability to in-
fluence social events – by the imaginary and the irratio-
nal«21. A religisation of politics occurs, a historical mis-
sion is assigned to political parties, and sacral attributes
are assigned to political leaders. A lost individual, sur-
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rendering to the leader, finds himself again. He com-
pletely identifies with the movement/party/leader and
their goals, which become his goals as well. By doing
that, he desubjectivizes and immerses himself into the
collectivist forms (a guided mass) and becomes suscepti-
ble to political manipulation. There, political myth func-
tions as a mean for restoring the distracted identity, it
becomes an essential cohesive actor which (re)integrates
the (previously disintegrated) society, not on an organic
basis, but based on irrational mythic elements and ideo-
logical concepts.
One of the most visible consequences of political my-
thology in totalitarian regimes is the creation of new
forms of organized communities within the society as a
whole, and most often opposed to it. In general terms, it
could most clearly be expressed in the context of classic
discernment between community and society where the
creation and development of (civil) society marks a key
heritage of the modernization process, and a prerequisite
of modern democracy.
Community (Gemeinschaft) is based on affective and
personal relationships of its members. In regulating so-
cial relations in the community, primordial and assigned
attributes (origin, status, social position, family) takes
precedence over the real value and contribution of a com-
munity member. Social roles are specific and mutually
consonant. Social stratification is determined in advance
and social roles rarely change, loyalty to the community
is considered a virtue. Religion, culture, and ethos of the
community are relatively homogenous and strongly in-
ternalized. In that way, the community encourages im-
mobility and impedes achieving social status via abilities
and merits. The community strengthens and protects the
moral code by raising moral tension, and proscribes
and/or ostracizes all who fail to conform. In the process
of modernization which gave birth to industrial mass so-
cieties and democracy, traditional communities dissolve
and grow into modern societies. That transition of the
community into a society is also marked as the transition
from the state of so-called mechanical solidarity into orga-
nic solidarity. In that sense, society (Gesellschaft) signi-
fies a continuum of impersonal and contractual relation-
ships. It is a contractual community (based on political
consensus), a legal-political entity composed of free and
equal members (abstract citizens) having equal rights
and obligations (equality before the law, equality of chances
for everyone) independently of their real differences which
are considered secondary and fall under the sphere of
privacy (age, sex, race, nationality, religion, socioeco-
nomic status, origin, etc.). Society is established as a free
and autonomous civil sphere, as opposed to the political
sphere (state). Dichotomy of the state and society mani-
fests itself through pattern variables: affectivity versus
affective neutrality, particularism versus universalism,
ascription versus achievement, diffuseness versus specifi-
city, collectivity-orientation versus self-orientation22. The
disintegration of the existing organic society and its sub-
stitution by newly created political society (new political
community, actually) signifies, not only an antidemocra-
tic revolution, but an antimodernist act par excellence.
Namely, totalitarian political projects don’t rebuild soci-
ety (as a legal-political entity) but community (fellowship
and solidarity on the basis of cultural and ethnic affilia-
tion and affective closeness). In doing so they use spe-
cially composed political myths with the purpose of com-
pletely disintegrating the civil structure of society and
bringing it under the total control of the political sphere.
A new, artificial national community is created here,
based on mythic elements and postulates of the political
ideology.
Depth of social fear that shook contemporary Western
societies usually was not proportionate to the cause of
that fear. The birth of political myth comes in the mo-
ment when social traumas transform into psychological
ones (when an individual feels them as an existential,
orienteering problem or a threat). It is created in the hid-
den rise of anxiety or uncertainty, thwarted aspirations
and futile expectations. On the ruins of extinguished be-
liefs, it builds new certainty and beliefs, restores the dis-
turbed balance into the lives of individuals and society,
and gives new meaning. Only thus, it is possible to un-
derstand the essence and the most obvious function of
the myth: a mental reorganization of human conscious-
ness.23 European societies after the First World War, par-
ticularly the German and Italian ones, were extremely
suitable for development of political myths. Full of mate-
rially deprived and sociopsychologically disoriented and
unsatisfied citizens, incapable of organizing their lives in
accordance with fragile democratic systems – they were
very suitable for projections of idealistic social reality
founded on myths, tradition, and folklore. These newly
created (political) myths and idealized visions of making
a new society enabled escape from a burdensome reality
and the illusion of participating in a collective national
action for the achievement of a better future. »Siegfried,
Kriemhild, Brunhild and Hagen – those are ancient
heroes and heroines with whom many modern Germans
wished to identify. With them, and with the world of the
barbaric, heathen Nibelungs – an irrational, heroic, mys-
tic world, full of betrayal and violence, drowned in blood,
and culminating in the Twilight of the gods (Götter-
dämmerung), as Valhalla, set on fire by Wotan after all
the blows of destiny, goes up in flames in an orgy of
self-destruction which has always fascinated the German
mind and answered some terrible longing in the German
soul. These heroes, this primitive, demonic world, had al-
ways existed »in the people’s soul«. In that German soul
could be felt the struggle between the spirit of civiliza-
tion and the spirit of the Nibelungs, and in the time with
which this history is concerned the latter seemed to gain
the upper hand. It is not at all surprising that Hitler
tried to surpass Wotan when in 1945 he ordered the de-
struction of Germany so that it could disappear in flames
along with him«24 In a similar way, Italian fascism, on
the basis of myth of the state as a new society and a new
Roman empire, created a system of beliefs, rituals, and
symbols; a new profane religion to mobilize large social
strata for the achievement of a totalitarian regime25.
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Along with the image of the future, they also offered a
scapegoat for the existing social problems, which served
as an object for expressing individual and collective an-
ger and frustration. In that Manichaean projection of
good and evil, harsh reality and a bright future, the solu-
tion to many problems, both on individual and societal
level, seemed within reach. The new totalitarian regime
– which established itself on the ruins of a fragile and
nonfunctional democracy which it tore down – guaran-
teed it with its decisiveness and persuasiveness. Only in
that way is it possible to understand the relative ease
with which the totalitarian political concept gained the
support of a considerable number of citizens in those so-
cieties.
Myth and Totalitarianism
In its intention of seizing power, and later the subsis-
tence of the regime, the totalitarian political government
proclaims an establishment of a new society, an ideal na-
tional community. In doing so, it assigns to itself the his-
toric mission of a leader in the realization of that project,
imposing it as a collective goal. In achieving that goal, it
introduces a complete (total) control over society. How-
ever, the subsistence of the totalitarian regime is based
not only on the means of coercion, but also on the popu-
lar support such a regime has. Namely, totalitarian re-
gimes heavily violated basic human and civil rights, but
at the same time created an impression that they can re-
alize human’s true mission and a perfect welfare state
better and far more efficiently that all previous state and
social forms. It was possible to implement that more effi-
ciently than ever before, due to availability of modern in-
struments of technology, propaganda, and communica-
tion. Precisely in that sense, totalitarianism is a political
phenomenon exclusive to twentieth century.
The communist myth of classless society and class
struggle, the fascist myth of state as a restored Roman
empire and Risorgimento as an unfinished national revo-
lution, and the nationalsocialist myth of the superiority
of the Arian race and a thousand-year Reich – were the
basis for ideologies justifying all acts of the totalitarian
regimes, including mass crimes, since they were pre-
sented as necessary and in the name of people, party, or
the leader. Political myths, mythic and ideological sym-
bols, and rituals of mass gatherings had the function of
mediating the irrational perception of national unity, and
expressing support and justification of acts of the politi-
cal government. Mythic symbols of death and resurrec-
tion (of class, state, nation), loyalty and followership,
mysticism of blood and soil, cults of sacrifice and hero-
ism, mass political gatherings with rituals of expressing
the collective strength and unity, the »communion« of ca-
maraderie – strengthened the perception of unity and
the belief that the totalitarian government is the one to
create the new, ideal society. Without that support, totali-
tarian regimes, regardless of their extremely repressive
character, wouldn’t manage to establish themselves, nor
could they sustain themselves any longer.
Technical resources of the modern age (especially the
means of mass communication, propaganda) and specific
social conditions (socioeconomic crisis, social entropy, so-
cial anomie, dissatisfaction and fear) were undoubtedly
the driving forces and/or catalysts for the rise and the
consolidation of totalitarian regimes. However, the ma-
nipulative power of totalitarian ideologies comes mostly
from the structure of the political myth, above all from
its two-value matrix. Namely, it’s about a manichaean
perception of real world based on a two-valued orienta-
tion. There are only two value poles: absolute good (the
pole containing us, our group, community, nation and/or
state) and absolute evil (the pole containing the others).
Between those two poles there is nothing – tertium non
datur. In the Third Reich these poles are Aryanism –
non-Aryanism. On the first one are courage, heroism,
self-discipline, honor, beauty, glory, health, joy. On the
other one are Jews, degeneration, rottenness, democracy,
internationalism. In Stalin’s Russia we also have two
poles. One contains the determinants: socialist, heroic,
progressive, democratic, scientific, and materialistic. The
other one: bourgeois, imperialist, capitalist, fascist, deca-
dent, idealistic, nonscientific26. Socio-cultural roots of
this two-valued orientation lie in primitive tribal rituals.
Their life was filled by constant struggle against natural
elements, enemies, wild beasts, and hostile spirits, so
such an orientation was natural. There was no freedom
in the acts of the individual; every act is in essence
»good« or »evil«, depending on whether it helps to sur-
vive or not, i.e. on the prevalent opinions and knowledge
of that subject. Therefore, in those primitive communi-
ties, each act is controlled by ritual duties or taboos, and
deviation from experience is not allowed, so these societ-
ies are static, closed up, and don’t advance because they
refuse to give a chance to the new27. That primaeval, but
essentially primitive value matrix is, in the totalitarian
context, converted into an ideological construct, i.e. in a
Manichaean political myth that (re)interprets actual po-
litical reality through the struggle of good against evil. In
a similar way, society is divided on us and them, good and
evil, and on that basis a struggle against evil and its bear-
ers is established as a prerequisite for the survival of
society. Precisely this aspect of the totalitarian political
mythology was the basis, firstly of ideological dehuman-
ization, and then institutionalized persecution and anni-
hilation of all those marked as enemies.
In this context, certain political myths that are com-
mon to all totalitarianisms have played particular roles.
The myth of the predestined party is incarnated through
the (one and only) leading party as the revolutionary
avantgarde in a historical mission to awake and lead the
otherwise lethargic masses, whether into the Commu-
nist’s classless society as a realm of freedom (from each
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs),
Fascist’s state as an unique and organic community (Il
nuovo Impero Romano), or Nazi Blut und Boden unity of
the nation, i.e. the Aryan race (Deutsches Reich). The
party is the one who knows the laws of historical develop-
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ment, and therefore has legitimacy as an absolute inter-
preter and router of state/society development.
The leader myth establishes unquestionable and ab-
solute authority of the charismatic (party, movement,
revolution) leader who has exceptional (prophetic, di-
vine) capabilities and who is an act of historical provi-
dence. Obedience, loyalty and followership come from de-
votion (even admiration) that subordinates feel towards
their leader with whom they want to identify. Thus – be-
cause the leader represents an incarnation of the com-
munity (people, nation, state, movement, party) – they
identify themselves with the community (e.g. Ein Volk,
ein Reich, ein Führer). This way, the followers feel not
only protected (by the power of the leader), but also as a
part of a community (rediscovered identity and strength-
ened confidence).
The enemy myth is undoubtedly one of the foremost
political myths of totalitarianism. All totalitarianisms
believed in the ubiquity of maleficent adversaries. Offi-
cially, enemies were defined on the basis of their poten-
tial for blocking the realization of the perfect community.
Actually, they were defined in accordance with the inter-
ests of a self-appointed revolutionary avantgarde and the
leader’s fixations. Their policies and acting were highly
inwrought with obsession of fight against conspiracies
and eliminating all the enemies on the road to the prom-
ised land. Utopian ideals, taken over from myths, were
used to legitimize the worst abuses against »objective«
enemies. Millions of human lives were destroyed as a re-
sult of the conviction that the sorry state of mankind
could be corrected if only the ideologically designated
»vermin« were eliminated. This ideological drive to pu-
rify humanity was rooted in the scientistic cult of tech-
nology and the firm belief that History had endowed the
revolutionary elites with the mission to get rid of the »su-
perfluous populations«28.
Although similar in many ways, it is not possible to
put an equal sign between communism, fascism, and
Nazism. Individual scrutiny of each of those totalitarian
regimes would considerably surpass the limits of this
analysis. Still, considering the fatal consequences, it is
necessary to consider at least the key aspects of the use of
political myth as a basis for dehumanization, where Na-
zism went furthest based on the myth of the superiority
of the Aryan race.
Besides the latent racism and anti-Semitism, which
always grew stronger in certain periods of crisis through
European history, the myth of the Aryan race also has its
(quasi)philosophical-anthropological roots. A. de Gobi-
neau considers the »Aryan« race above all others, and
that it’s being threatened by »racial mixing« with »non-
-Aryan« races, which are less worthy and evolutionally
lower positioned. Inspired by Darwin’s theory of natural
selection and the survival of the fittest29, he mechani-
cally applies his biological ideas on human society (social
Darwinism) and develops a theory about the right of the
»strong« to rule the »weak«.30 H.S. Chamberlain, in his
racial theory, puts forward a vision in which the »Aryan
race«, led by the Germans, saves the Christianic Euro-
pean civilization from its main enemy – »Judaism«31. A.
Rosenberg, one of the main ideologists of nazism, devel-
oped a quasi-philosophical theory of racism. Unlike his
predecessors, for him, race was a spiritual, not a biologi-
cal concept: individuals of a certain race belonged to a
unique entity, had a common spirit, while individuals are
merely its expressions. He introduces ancient pagan
myths (Nordic oral tradition, ancient Germanic beliefs
and cults) which he uses to push out Christian ideas and
religion, and on a manichaean basis he postulates the
ideas of white (Aryan) superiority, extreme (German) na-
tionalism and anti-Semitism. On those assumptions he
concludes that the best and cleanest German-Aryan race
is destined to rule, while less important, culturally infe-
rior races exist in order to serve them. The so-called peo-
ple’s state (VolksStaat) was supposed to serve to achieve
the superiority of the German nation and to preserve the
purity of the race. It meant the realization of a racial re-
gime in which the Aryan race, i.e. the German nation, es-
tablishes itself as the absolute ruler and master that de-
mands the subordination of the inferior and the weak32.
On that foundation, A. Hitler in Mein Kampf promotes
the thesis of a »Jewish danger«, i.e. a Jewish conspiracy
with the goal of acquiring world dominance, which be-
comes a basis for their later persecution and extermina-
tion (the Holocaust) and the conquest of other »non-
-Aryan« peoples. The affiliation of the German people
with the Aryan race gives them the right to extend their
living space (Lebensraum), at the expense of other
(mainly eastward) countries, justifying the war aggres-
sion.
After the collapse of totalitarian regimes (firstly fas-
cism and Nazism, and their condemnation in Nürnberg),
and later the USSR (before that, by abandoning and con-
demning Stalinism), and the processes of democratiza-
tion from the end of the twentieth century (democratic
transition of postauthoritarian societies), their revival
seemed no longer possible. However, it still happened,
and with striking similarity. Of course, is about the
great-Serbian ideology and war aggression against the
neighbouring nations/states emerging from the dissolu-
tion of the Yugoslavian federation. Without getting into
the details of that complex process, here has to be point-
ed out the great power of regressive political activity
based on political myth. The tragic experience caused by
the totalitarian regimes of the past century did not act
inhibitory, not even sufficiently warning.
National political myth could be defined as the phe-
nomenon of high-level persuasive ideological eros, which
serves as an emotional starting point of revolutionary ac-
tivities in a socio-political moment. In this context, it is
interesting to observe the myth as a starting point for
socio-political action. A good example of this is, for exam-
ple, the attitude towards Serbianism in Montenegro. The
phrase that the Serbian and Montenegrin people are
»two eyes in one head« is well-known. This phrase, based
on a myth, has even got its lyrical version in a song:
»Who says so, who is lying that Serbia is small, it’s not
small, it wasn’t small when it was fighting three times in
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a war, who says so, who is lying that Serbian does not
have the sea, we have the sea, we have the sea as long as
there is Montenegro«.
The affirmation of Serbianism in Montenegro, as a
political myth, is first mentioned at the beginning of the
18th century. Then, for everyday political purposes, bish-
ops of the Petrovi} Njego{ dynasty begin to invoke the
heroic tales and myths based on retrieved mythical heri-
tage of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The church has
had a noticeable impact in Montenegro after the arrival
of Nemanji}i and was considered a social authority of the
time. Since the ethnical identification was not clear then
and vast majority of the citizens of Montenegro illiterate,
the idea of »borrowing« Serbian myth did not provoke re-
sistance. Supporting the extent to which it is possible to
affect the consciousness of the people and »national
code« is the fact that many Montenegrins to this day, on
the basis of »borrowed« Serbian myths, believe that the
age-old ties bind them with the Serbian people. We can
conclude that in this particular case the power of the
mythical narratives outweighed the credibility and ve-
racity of the mythemes, so it gradually, in a roundabout
way, defined the Montenegrin national consciousness,
based on the synergy of their own identity and assumed
Serbian myths. Montenegrin national ideological start-
ing points, which grew out of a myth, eventually became
accepted as a fundamental national beliefs. From this it
can be concluded that the doctrine of the myth definitely
affects the consciousness of the nation and shapes its po-
litical-ideological cognitive matrix.
One part of the indoctrination with the myth stems
from the influence of King Nikola I, whose mission was
to restore »Dushan’s empire« (the idea of creating a com-
mon state in the territories of Serbia and Montenegro,
Bosnia, Herzegovina, southern Dalmatia, »Old Serbia«
and Macedonia). This idea was based on a strong belief of
alliances and ancient ties between Serbia and Monte-
negro.
As a »historical successor of Nemanji} dynasty«, king
Nikola I was given Dushan’s cross and the sword of king
Milutin (which later turned out to be false) by the rus-
sian emperor Alexander II. It is assumed that the false
sword was made by the order of Karlovac metropolita-
nate, around which were created myths and all the songs
related to the loss of the Battle of Kosovo. Metropoli-
tanate later, as a sign of good relations, gave the sword to
the Russian Orthodox Church. Nikola’s keenness by the
false sword, as a symbol of Serbian pride, as well as with
himself as a chosen restorer of »Dushan’s empire« (by
the edict of Serbia and Russia), had shaped his political
views and thus directly affected the alliance and the im-
mediacy of relations between Montenegro and Serbia. A
nice detail that illustrates the level of identification with
the myth and belief in him being »chosen« to implement
it is the fact that in September of 1921, near his death in
exile, he asked that his sword lay on his chest before he
exhaled33.
It is quite clear that the elements of mythemes, trans-
mitted by the narratives, are being long-term implanted
in the consciousness of the people and collective identity.
For example, the myth of Kosovo Battle begins to occupy
an important ideological and socio-political space in
Montenegro in the first half of the 19th century. Petrovic
dynasty, with a big help from the church and bishops,
skillfully created the then »PR campaign« in order to em-
phasize its importance and to gain certain »political
points«, arguing that the national state-building alliance
between Montenegro and Serbia was already present
since the Middle Ages. This hypothesis, of course, was
based on Serbian myths, through the assumed mythemes
and conceived, pragmatically oriented narratives. From
today’s historical point of view, it is quite clear that this
thesis is entirely untenable, because during the Middle
Ages, according to the historians, the Serbian nation was
formed exclusively as a religious community (millet) and
not a defined state entity.
Serbian myths are very present in the Balkans and
mythologization has infiltrated not only the political, but
also the social-cultural domain. The famous saying of the
founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Saint Sava, is
»The Serbian people are predestined by fate to be the
East to the West and West to the East«, and that the only
force stronger than the Serbian power is »Heavenly Jeru-
salem, and nothing on Earth«. In addition, he called the
Serbian people »Israel« and his father Nemanja »Abra-
ham«.34
There is yet another myth of St. Sava – »Svetosavlje«
– according to Metropolitan Nikolaj Velimirovi} the most
authentic form of faith, which fundamental postulate is
the fact that the West has separated away from the origi-
nality of Christ’s teachings and that the Balkans is »the
last bastion of true Christianity, which has managed to
make a synthesis of the active, practical approach to
Christianity of the West on the one hand and a medita-
tive, mystical approach to religion that is present in the
East on the other«.
For the needs of everyday political agitation, today
there is present the reduction of St. Sava to the right in-
clined political ideology called »St. Sava nationalism«,
with its origin in Serbian myths. By Velimirovi}, Serbia
has its apostolic mission »to inveigle the East to baptism
and the West to repentance«. The faith in Serbia, accord-
ing to Velimirovi}, is in crisis because Serbia is engulfed
in the »European disease«: intellectualism has developed
and there has been a dissolution from the healthy, peas-
ant way of life and thinking, which are ideal. Deeming
the nation as a religious category, Velimirovi} believes
that the suffering of Serbian people throughout the his-
tory are the same as »Christ’s suffering on the cross«. It
is interesting that these claims by Velimirovi}, cum
grano salis, can be understood as a creation of a modern
myth, which will (if repeated sufficiently) eventually be-
come part of the Serbian social habitus35.
Thus, the myths of Kosovo and St. Sava are the foun-
dation of Serbian mythology through which runs a cru-
cial mytheme of invincibility (sic!) of the Serbian army
and the Serbs as »heavenly people«. The main reasons
why the Kosovo myth turned into myth poetics and na-
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tional symbolism, among other, is hidden in the epic
scope of the battle, which, according to legend, counted
around 70,000 Serbian soldiers and 140,000 Ottomans.
However, this number has been significantly reduced by
contemporary historians to 30,000 Ottomans and 20,000
Serbian soldiers. Also, heroic poems emerged after the
battle that depicted moments from the battlefield, where
it was particularly attractive to emphasize and express
domestic prowess and numerical superiority of the en-
emy army.
Ljubinka Trgov~evi}, an expert and analyst of Kosovo
myth, identifies its key elements36.
1. The motive of glory and eternal memory, as a prom-
ise to all who follow the legendary examples: heroes who
accept the sacrifice and heroism (like prince Lazar and
Milo{ Obili}), mothers who raise their sons to war (as the
mother of the Jugovi} brothers), girlfriends and sisters
who are treat heroic wounds (as Kosovka does), etc.
Here is evident the so-called »mythical stereotype« –
the heroism and sacrifice to reach higher goals. Interest-
ingly, it is precisely this motif that is usually staged in the
culturology of a myth and the most common motif in folk
songs, art (vases, carpets, paintings...), etc.
2. The motif of sacrifice and martyrdom for faith and
freedom, which implies a complete sacrifice, even unto
death, and in return offers the promise of »heavenly
kingdom«, eternal glory and memory. The death on the
battlefield is encouraged, as opposed to life with enemies.
Here the motive of »kingdom of heaven« is present,
which the Serbian heroes superimpose to that of the
»earthly realm«. That is the motive of »induced hero-
ism«, whereby the defeat on the battle field, through the
folk tradition, is trying to turn into the antithesis and be
perceived as the metaperception of the final victory at a
higher level of consciousness.
3. The motive of revenge, or »revenge for Kosovo«,
which implies the restoration of the Serbian state in the
territories where once was the expulsion of »infidels« –
Turks and Muslims.
Motive of heretics and true believers is one of the old-
est motives in myths or mythemes. Heretics are usually
aggressive newcomers who are trying to baptize indige-
nous people, which is a very potent motive in folk tradi-
tion because it is abundant in conventional stereotypes –
believers/non-believers, from which it then follows a se-
ries of emotionally colored narratives.
4. The motive of betrayal, which serves as an excuse
for the defeat, because it suggests that the enemy is not
better or more brave, but the cause of the defeat is be-
trayal. Vuk Brankovi} was named the traitor, which has
no historical basis. This motive is a warning to contem-
poraries that they should belong to the majority, other-
wise anathema and permanent exclusion from the com-
munity will occure.
The desire for homogenization and praisal of unity for
better or worse is also a very common mythical motive.
According to some authors, it was derived from the battle
of Kosovo and found its place in the national anthem of
the former Yugoslavia in the verse: »Damned be the trai-
tor of his homeland...«. In this specific example, the
dialectical message of dishonesty and betrayal mytheme
abolishes the defeat of Serbs (because they would have
never been beaten if not betrayed by Vuk Brankovi}),
while creating an additional mythological »aura« around
Kosovo battle with the above mentioned motives.
The historian Aleksandar ]iri} believes that the key
three elements are very useful for the political use of the
Kosovo myth37: a commitment to martyrdom (»kingdom
of heaven«), suicide feat (Milo{ Obili} kills Murat by
fraud), and treason (despite the actual historical role of
Vuk Brankovi}). Very similar to the previous motive
analysis, ]iri} pursues mythic motives of martyrdom,
suicide ventures for the good of the people and betrayals
as foundations of Kosovo myth.
Despite the subsequent historical factography that al-
most completely rehabilitated the figure of Vuk Bran-
kovi}, he remained the first Serbian »mythical traitor«.
Except for the fact that this could justify the inflicted de-
feat in battle, this motive also had ideologically political
function. Specifically, every possible future conversion to
Islam could have been anathematised and demonized be-
cause it was equated, pars pro toto, with treason and per-
sonified in the figure of Vuk Brankovi}.
Today it is known that Vuk Brankovi} was a feudal
lord who lived at the end of the 14th century and the
son-in-law of prince Lazar. He refused to accept vassal re-
lationship, which is why he ended up in the Ottoman
slavery, where he finally died. Motive of Vuk Brankovi}
as a traitor was not negatively romanced until the 16th
century in the Orthodox church circles, as a counterbal-
ance to many pagan myths.
Regarding the example of the interpretation of the
Kosovo myth, it can be concluded that the existence of
the myth is of great importance to the moral concept of a
nation. The myth can be defined as a collective con-
sciousness of a nation and a recording of a nation’s men-
tal code, created in a given time under given circum-
stances. The myth’s task is to preserve its underlying
mytheme and – through the narrative – survive and re-
sist the time and ideologies, and thereby preserve the
idea of national identity and its own uniqueness.
Very similar links, that go in the direction of the glori-
fication of one nation and one race, can be discerned in
the ideology of Nazism. With the appointment of Adolf
Hitler as a German Chancellor on January 30th 1933 be-
gan the making of Nazi Germany, based on the myth of
the superior Aryan race. Here is an obvious parallel with
the Serbian national mythology, in which the Serbs (on
the basis of Kosovo battle) created a tradition of them-
selves as the chosen, »heavenly« people. Except the fact
that the mythem and ideological preferences of nazism
and Great Serbia are very similar, their narratives also
have an institutional affiliation. Namely, Hitler’s »Mein
Kampf«, in many ways based on the (re) interpretation of
the classic and the creation of new (political) myths,
served as an explicated paradigm and justification of the
German aspirations for expansion and conquest, based
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on particularities of a selected Aryan race for dominance
over other nations.
The famous old Serbian folk song »Nobody has what
the Serb has« illustrates and suggests a deep incorpora-
tion of myths in self-perception of Serbian people. It is
enough to analyze song’s keywords and used private
names and battles (underlined), to get a picture of impor-
tance of myth in Serb’s folklore. »Niko nema {ta Srbin
imade. Takav bio takav i ostade. Srbin ima svoju krsnu
slavu. Krsnu slavu, svetitelja Savu. Od Kosova pa sve
naovamo. Mi junake sve redom imamo. Srbin ima Milo{
Obili}a. Obili}a, devet Jugovi}a. Srbin ima Toplicu Mi-
lana. Srbin ima Kosan~i} Ivana. Srbin ima kraljevi}a
Marka. Koga prizna turska vojska carska. Srbin ima
~et’ri slova prava, samo sloga Srbina spa{ava. Jedno
drugom okrenulo le|a, te{ko onom ko Srbina vre|a.«
On the other hand, the SANU memorandum was ac-
tually a legalized conquering pursuit of expansion of the
Serbian state, conceived in Serbian myths and encour-
aged by Gara{anin’s »Na~ertanije« from 1844. With his
famous speech at Gazimestan, the site of the largest Ser-
bian myth and on the anniversary of the Kosovo battle,
Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 announces: »We’re in the
same place, facing battles and battles, which are not
armed, although no such can not be excluded«, which
represents the awakening of the demons from the myth
of Kosovo battle.
With the coming to power of the National Socialist
Party, the fundamental nazi strategic determinations
were the implementation of antisemitism, complete stig-
matization of judaism and bolshevism, as well as the
need to expand the »living space«, especially at the ex-
pense of Slavs. At the same time, as an ideological »fuel«
for the realization of these goals, thrives the German
myth of the Slavs, English and French as obstacles in the
way of German progress and causes of German back-
wardness.
A parallel with the politics of Great Serbia, based on a
myth, can also be seen here, with significant ideological
similarities between Nazis and Serbians. For instance, in
the early nineties, in the media gradually ran the myth of
demonic Croatia and Croatians as a genocidal nazi help-
ers and all non-Serbian peoples of former Yugoslavia
were systematically demonized as inferior.
The essential idea of nazism is based on the claim that
the German people are under attack and must be united,
disciplined and achieve victory in combat against the en-
emy. In a very similar pattern, the sublimated idea from
Serbian myths about »heavenly nation« puts »all Serbs
in one state«, while the same in the »Log Revolution« of
1990 finds its casus belli: to occupy Croatia under the
auspices of the alleged protection of the Serbian people
and the overall serbianism.
During Hitler’s reign, the Nazis advocated national
homogenization, claiming to thus be defending the Ger-
man people, with special emphasis on the Germans out-
side of Germany, which later served as a logical and
straightforward cause for war actions and conquest of
foreign territory. The idea of the Nazis was to make a
strong, homogeneous ethnic state under the idea of Pan-
-Germanism, while the Serbian aggression had charac-
teristics of Pan-Serbianism. The basic motto of Pan-
-Serbianism was by Karad`i}: »Serbs all and everywhere
/ wherever there is a Serb, there is Serbia« and derivative
»all Serbs in one state«. This phrase was later often cited
as a justification in the war against Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina38.
Conclusion
Myths are ancient beliefs about the order of nature
and the world, and people and societies in them; they’re
allegories used to explain the history of a nation. As such,
they are an instrument for understanding and interpret-
ing the society, which is framed within tradition. In that
way, myth represents order in the chaotic world; it is a
template for the establishment of the (traditional) soci-
ety, because it is beyond right and wrong; it marks endur-
ing values. The myths of a certain nation are an organic
element of cultural heritage and its perception of itself
and the world around it. Unlike traditional myths, the
political myth concerns specific aspects of social (politi-
cal) reality, to which it attributes special characteristics
(transcendental, sacral). Upon the basis of original mean-
ing of the myth (mythemes), it constructs distinctive
mythic narratives that directly serve certain political
goals. The political myth is therefore a pseudo-myth.
That, however, does not diminish its power; indeed, in
the conditions of modern mass societies, its strength
reaches its peak.
Deeply rooted in social and political activity, myth can
serve progressive and regressive politics alike, where the
latter stems primarily from its irrational and practical
character. So, political ideology – regularly inspired by
myth – has a key role in the creation of modern nations
and states; the mythic elements it contains have a pro-
nounced cohesive and integrative function there. Myth
enables the creation of the fundamental self-image and
purpose, and provides a sense of the past as well as a di-
rection for the future. However, myths can reflect and
propagate false and misleading ideas. Due to the strength
of the tradition, i.e. the implicit rootedness of myth – lies
and prejudice, cloaked in mythic form, can be an ex-
tremely powerful means of manipulation. Therefore,
those who create and control political myths have a real
power. Political myths then serve to justify the political
power/regime and its actions, i.e. to conceal and blur so-
cial reality. They become an instrument of ideological
mystification and political manipulation. By influencing
the citizens’ psyche, they move their emotions and moti-
vation, steering their behavior in the direction of realiza-
tion of the regime‘s pragmatic goals. However, the essen-
tial prerequisite of such activity is a particular set of
social circumstances that favor the development of irra-
tionality and the wide adoption of the mythic conscious-
ness. Socioeconomic deprivation and value anomie – char-
acteristic features of great social crises – cause socio-psy-
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chological insecurity, disorientation, and fear. Precisely
such a situation – when the social trauma is converted to
psychological problems of the individual – is the ideal
space for creation and adoption of political myths. With
the promises of a new, better society, and with the inte-
grative power of new collectiveness, it enables the indi-
vidual and entire social strata to re-realize their identity
and meaning.
Precisely this strength of the political myth was used
by totalitarian regimes emerging from the great social
crisis after World War I. They represent the pinnacle of
creation of ideological constructions with origins in an-
cient myths, scientism, organicism, historicism, and vol-
untarism. Founded upon immanent utopias rooted in es-
chatological fervor, totalitarian regimes forged their own
versions of modernity based on programs of radical
change that advocated homogenization as well as social,
economic, and cultural transformation presupposing »the
wholesale renovation of the body of the people«39.
The concept of the totalitarian state shows a pro-
nounced revival of mythic characteristics. Indeed, the to-
talitarian state in many ways founds its legitimacy upon
the very political myth it creates. From a functionalistic
standpoint, a totalitarian state, since established irratio-
nally, on a myth, instead of a social contract, thus outside
of the course of history, can look like a fiction. From a
sociopolitical and anthropological standpoint, however,
the totalitarian state warns of the danger of the destruc-
tion of society and its organic relations in a situation
when the relationship between the state and the citizens
acquires a mythic character, and loses the rational one.
In that way, it depersonalizes its citizens, completely po-
liticizes them, and becomes the real subject and the cen-
ter of their personality. Precisely in that utter destruc-
tion of society as an organic and autonomous civil sphere,
and the construction of a new (founded upon mythic and
ideological postulates) and completely controlled political
community (the communist classless society, the fascist
unique and organically articulated state, the Nazi com-
munity united by blood and soil and belonging to the
Aryan race) – a social and anthropologic devolution is
manifested. It marks not only and anti-liberal and anti-
-modern act par excellence, but also a civilizational de-
cline.
Although cohesive and integrative elements of the
myth strengthen the community’s self-sustainability,
they can also serve to create hatred against other com-
munities, up to the point of demands for their annihila-
tion, especially if it is being fostered (the utopian promise
of a perfect society, fear of the danger coming from the
enemy and the resolve to preemptively destroy him). The
ideology and functioning of totalitarian regimes are an
outstanding example of such activity. Based on a two-val-
ued matrix, i.e. on a bipolar manichaean myth that re-
duces the whole of political and social life on a relation
between good and evil, us and them, the totalitarian po-
litical regime marks as enemy everyone whom it thinks
to stand in the way of the realization of the collective (ac-
tually, the regime’s) goal. Precisely this aspect of totali-
tarian political mythology was a basis for the annihila-
tion of all marked as enemies of the regime (the commu-
nist dictatorship of the proletariat and the destruction of
the class enemy, the fascist dictatorship and persecution
of political opponents, the Nazi racial purity laws and the
Holocaust). The class-social, palingenetic-national, so-
cial-darwinistic, and racist (quasi)theories served to ad-
ditionally elaborate and justify the pronounced political
repression, dehumanization, and war aggression, whose
scale and consequences marked the most tragic era in the
modern history.
Structural parallels between totalitarian regimes grow-
ing out from political myths of the twentieth century, and
primitive cultural forms based on archaic myths, can be
seen in the function of the leader, the language (rhetoric,
discourse), and the rituals. In both cases, the collective
wishes are projected on a prophetic and divinized leader
(homo divinans). The logic and semantic functions of the
language are replaced by magical meanings, while the
rituals involve all members of the society and all spheres
of life. The cult of tradition and syncretism, irratio-
nalism, the enemy myth and conspiracy theory, the lead-
er myth and the party myth, cult of heroes and cult of
death, and populism, are particularly noticeable. Regard-
less of the type of regime (communism, fascism, nazism),
they are all characterized by an overall (total) governing
of a single political party and its leadership (the leader)
which assign to themselves knowledge and the historic
mission of achieving a utopian future, which they use to
justify their demand for complete subordination and
followership.
It is clear that the totalitarian systems are positively
sensitized to the effective impacts of mythical features,
moreover, often quite expressively rely on them. Follow-
ing the Goebbels phrase that the lie repeated a hundred
times becomes the truth, totalitarian systems position
mythic material as an unequivocal assumption of the su-
periority of people and nation, thus effectively justifying
their ideological aspirations. Paradigmatic role of myth
in modern history is certainly evident in the attempt of
realization of Great Serbia. Specifically, on the basis of
mythem of Kosovo battle Serbs and the narrative of
Serbs as a »heavenly people«, an aggression was carried
out against other nations of ex-Yugoslavia, all under im-
plicit, but very distinctive idiom in which it is very easy
to recognize the influence of a myth. Using similar, al-
most identical motives of totalitarian regimes o the first
half of the 20th century, Serbian aggression called for
chosen »heavenly« to lead other nations, correction of
ancient injustices done to the Serbian people, Pan-Serb-
ianism, ie. homogenisation of the Serbian people (»All
Serbs in one state...«). Fundamental apotheosis of Ser-
bian specialties, bravery and willingness to achieve the
aspirations of ancient Serbian people arise from Serbian
myths. It is very easy to notice their similarity with the
objectives of past totalitarian regimes (especially the
Nazi), also created on a myth (superior Aryan race
should rule the world, Pan-Germanism, the protection of
Germans outside Germany, aggression toward the »low-
er« nations, etc.). Because of everything mentioned in
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this paper, it is clear that the myth is directly or indi-
rectly rooted in the corpus, animus and habitus of almost
every nation. However, mythical features especially come
to the fore in the ideologies of the totalitarian regime, re-
gardless of the time of their creation. In doing so, totali-
tarian regimes consider myth to be the historical truth,
while the narrative pragmatically spruces up, by adjust-
ing the context of time and set circumstances, in an ef-
fort to realize broader ideological political objectives.
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POLITI^KI MITOVI I TOTALITARIZAM: ANTROPOLO[KA ANALIZA NJIHOVOG UZRO^NOG
ODNOSA
S A @ E T A K
U ~lanku se razmatraju klju~ne politi~ke, antropolo{ke i sociokulturne funkcije politi~kih mitova u pojavi i funk-
cioniranju totalitarnih re`ima. Pritom se poseban naglasak stavlja na strukturne elemente mita (miteme) i na mitske
sadr`aje (narative) u procesima artificijelne konstrukcije novog dru{tva (zajednice) temeljene na mitom inspiriranim
ideolo{kim postulatima. U radu se tvrdi da je uspostava totalitarizma ozna~ila stanovitu antropolo{ku devoluciju. Ta se
devolucija pak odvija kroz dekonstrukciju gra|anskog dru{tva kao organske dru{tvene sfere i artificijelnu konstrukciju
nove politi~ke zajednice temeljene na ideolo{kim postulatima i politi~kim mitovima. U argumentaciji te tvrdnje najprije
se pokazuje kako su mitski narativi preto~eni u politi~ke koncepte i programe bili osnova (re)interpretacije svijeta,
dru{tva i pojedinca, te su bitno odredili prirodu i funkcioniranje totalitarnih re`ima. Potom se analiziraju i kompariraju
specifi~ni politi~ki mitovi, njihov sadr`aj i porijeklo, a posebno njihova dvojaka funkcija. Ona se pak analizira u okviru
klasi~ne dihotomije dru{tvo – zajednica, gdje se (gra|ansko) dru{tvo socio-politi~ki utemeljuje na dru{tvenom ugovoru,
a (politi~ka) zajednica socio-antropolo{ki na politi~kom mitu. U situaciji krize identiteta i legitimiteta te vrijednosne
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anomije i slabljenja dru{tvene kohezije – {to su karakteristi~ni uvjeti velike ekonomske i politi~ke krize s po~etka dva-
desetog stolje}a koji su omogu}ili pojavu totalitarizma – dru{tvo kao ugovorna zajednica ne funkcionira. Sna`na potreba
za smislom (na individualnoj i dru{tvenoj razini) utje~e na prijem~ivost gra|ana (politi~kim) konceptima (re)konstitu-
cije (politi~ke) zajednice s kojom se mogu identificirati. Upravo tu totalitarni pokreti rabe kohezivnu mo} politi~kog
mita koji zamjenjuje racionalno utemeljenu konstituciju dru{tva i postaje sredstvo ideolo{ke mistifikacije i politi~ke
manipulacije. Djeluju}i na psihu gra|ana, on pokre}e njihove osje}aje i motivacije i usmjerava njihovo pona{anje u
smjeru ostvarivanja ciljeva totalitarne politi~ke vlasti. Na aktualnost politi~kih mitova i opasnost od o`ivljavanja totali-
tarnih tendencija upozoravaju i nedavne iteracije totalitarizma (velikosrpska agresija) s jednakim tragi~nim posljedi-
cama.
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